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Reﬂecting Tragedy: 
Nietzsche, Lacan, 
Narcissus1 
Anthony Stephens
THIS essay is concerned neither with Nietzsche’s philosophy nor his life. 
Rather, its focus is on Nietzsche as the author of ﬁctions that derive from 
or allude to the myth of Narcissus. To avoid misunderstandings, it must be 
made clear at the outset that considering The Birth of Tragedy in the context 
of certain narratives that have attached themselves to the mythical ﬁgure 
of Narcissus does not mean belabouring the platitude that Nietzsche had 
an extremely narcissistic personality.2  My intention is, on the contrary, to 
ascertain whether certain thought-patterns which may be discovered in 
variants of the Narcissus myth can also be revealed in writing by Nietzsche 
which raises questions as to what he understood by ﬁctionality.
As far as narcissism as a psychological concept is concerned, the futility 
of the quest for a single deﬁnition is made manifest in an essay by S. O. 
Hoffmann, whose title translates as: “Not seeing the wood for the trees, or: 
the conceptual chaos in contemporary theories of narcissism.”3  This is not 
the place to attempt the ordering of such chaos, as the task offers endless 
scope for quibbling as to deﬁnitions. Sufﬁce it to say that cutting any path 
through this wood is going to leave some jagged branches protruding.
There are two main differences between the various versions of the 
ancient Narcissus myth and its revival by Freud and his successors: ﬁrst, 
the ancient traditions may be termed etiological – that is: treating of origins 
and causes – but only in a trivial sense, whereas the essence of its modern, 
psychoanalytic variants is that they are causal and genetic.4  Second, the 
ancient traditions relate a story of the fatal consequences of misperception 
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and lack any utopian perspective. Against this, the narratives of the loss 
of that state designated by Freud as “primary narcissism” belong to the 
topos of the lost paradise. In terms of Freud’s well-known statement, “the 
development of the Ego consists of a falling away from primal narcissism 
and of an intense striving to regain this state”.5 
In Ovid’s version, illusion and subjugation to the imaginary Other 
initially coincide. In a second phase, this misapprehension gives way to 
the insights: “iste ego sum [...] uror amore mei” – “this I am [... ] I burn 
with love of myself”, but this in no way lessens the ﬁxation of Narcissus 
on his reﬂection. Indeed, it survives both death and the dissolution of the 
body, so that Narcissus persists even in the underworld in admiring his 
image in the waters of the Styx: “tum quoque se ... in Stygia spectabat 
acqua”.6   What more recent mythical narratives term “the libidinal cathexis 
of the self-image” is clearly worked out in Ovid’s version as a dialectic of 
desire and autonomy.7 
Jacques Lacan’s signiﬁcant recasting of the Freudian version of the 
myth may be seen as bringing it back into greater accordance with Ovid’s 
dynamic in two respects: ﬁrst, by putting the factor of misapprehension, 
in the form of a “fonction de méconnaissance”, into the foreground once 
more; second, by depriving the primal state of the self of its utopian aspect: 
in Freud’s terms, the enjoyment of “infant omnipotence” in unalloyed 
bliss. Lacan, by contrast, introduces from the outset the negative aspects 
of misapprehension and the consequent alientation of self from self. 
This becomes evident from the fourth thesis in his essay L’aggressivité en 
psychanalyse: “This erotic relationship in which the human individuality 
becomes ﬁxated on an image which alienates it from itself – it is in this 
nexus that the energy and the form both reside from which that passionate 
structure that will be termed its I takes its origin.”8 
The main consequence of Lacan’s inversion of the Freudian myth 
is to render the genesis of the metapsychic model independent of any 
speciﬁc gratifying or traumatic experiences in the life of a child and rather 
substitute for them a paradigmatic scheme. Since the work of Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, it is common to assign myths paradigmatic and syntagmatic 
dimensions. In the psychoanalytic tradition before Lacan the trend was to 
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stress a syntagmatic serialisation of the elements of narcissism, precisely 
because the prime intention of therapists and writers was to reveal the 
successive stages of a “repressed” childhood in their correct chronological 
order. 
At the beginning of his essay of 1936 on the “mirror stage” Lacan 
apparently sets out to relate in a conventionally Freudian mode the 
“novel” of earliest childhood: “the human infant, at an age when it is 
still for a while outpaced in respect of physical coordination by a baby 
chimpanzee, none the less already clearly recognises its own image in the 
mirror [...]”.9  But from Lacan’s later writings it becomes obvious that his 
real aim has nothing whatsoever to do with a narrative reconstruction of 
the stages of earliest childhood, but that instead he is intent on bringing 
to the surface a paradigmatic model which is overlaid by a plurality of 
narrative pretexts.
In doing so, however, he invests too much in the one “stage” or episode, 
for he persists in narrating divergent versions of it as if they were all the 
same. The child, for Lacan, has to both recognise and mistake itself in 
the same instant: greet itself with delight and simultaneously enter into 
a hostile rivalry with its own image; experience the encounter with its 
reﬂection as pleasurable and at the same time resent the superiority of 
the mirror image; ﬁnally, transfer these emotions into aggression against 
the Other as such. This can be logically possible only on the basis of an 
incapacity to distinguish between such contrary experiences, for the child 
has, at the same time, to be both afforded gratiﬁcation and delight and 
deceived and estranged from an image which „alienates it from itself“.10 
If Lacan is indeed mainly interested in working towards a symmetrical, 
paradigmatic structure for the world of adult experience, the precise 
succession of events and their respective emotional colouring in the 
life of the young child is not only ultimately unveriﬁable but also of no 
importance. The myth of Narcissus is primarily relevant as an exfoliated 
structure, which diverts attention from its syntagmatic dimension.
What seems of major importance in Lacan’s recasting of the myth is the 
explicit extension of that misapprehension present in ancient traditions 
back to the point where it constitutes a primal principle of ﬁctionality. 
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Thus we read in Lacan’s essay on the “mirror stage”: “But the essential 
point is that this form places the instance of the self, prior to any social 
determination, in a series of ﬁctions which remains forever opaque, 
hence irreducible, for that same individual”.11  It is now time to consider 
how Nietzsche relates the concept of ﬁctionality to the constitution of 
the self.
The concept of ﬁctionality was never a neutral one for Nietzsche and 
represents a recurrent point of uncertainty or discomfort in his writings. It 
is neither something he consistently rejects, nor does he exempt it from the 
enormous resentment he directs against the concept of truth, particularly 
in his later works. For Nietzsche strangely confuses the enjoyment of 
ﬁctional works with the question of belief. In Human, All Too Human he 
asserts dogmatically of the “artists of all times”: “[...] they glorify the 
religious and philosophical errors of humankind, and they would have 
been quite unable to do so without a belief in the absolute truth of these” 
(KSA 2, 180). 
Granted, he asserts the opposite in the same work, when he sets up 
the alternative model of an unbelieving artist whose pleasure in his own 
creations he describes as a feeling of being at ease: “The irreligiousness of 
artists.  – Homer is so much at home among his gods and has, as a poet, 
such a feeling of ease with them, that he must surely have been deeply 
irreligious [...]” (KSA 2, 121). This is not merely typical of the fact that 
Nietzsche could rarely go for long without indulging in self-contradiction, 
but it also seems to indicate that he unconsciously distinguishes between 
different kinds of ﬁction.
In other words, there are for Nietzsche voluntary and involuntary 
ﬁctions, and this is the determining factor in whether he marks ﬁction 
positively or negatively. Thus he permits poets such as Homer to make 
up fables about entities in whose existence they do not believe, because 
they are deliberately creating untruths. In these terms he accepts a “delight 
in lying” as one of those factors “by which art is determined” (KSA 2, 
311). In contrast to this, there are those who mistakenly believe in entities 
whose existence is only linguistic and these are the involuntary victims 
of ﬁctions they do not recognise as such. Philosophers seem even more 
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prone to fall into such traps than poets: “Words are the seductresses of 
philosophers – these ﬂap about in the nets of language” (KSA 8, 113). Thus 
they involuntarily cause those ﬁctions to be fruitful and multiply which 
tyrannise the human psyche.
If there were for Nietzsche only the alternatives of a Homeric delight 
in fabulation and the metaphysicians’ subjugation to illusory authorities, 
then we would have just the simple polarity of the splendid artistic 
creations of great liars and the misery of those who are seduced and 
abandoned by abstract concepts and the grammar that orders them. But 
this neat antithesis is spoiled by the fact that, when Nietzsche began to 
write at the beginning of the 1870’s, he did so on the basis of a symmetrical 
structuring of the human self, the cosmos and the work of art. To preserve 
this symmetry, his concept of ﬁction becomes skewed from very early on so 
as to satisfy demands which are at odds with one another. This results from 
the ironic circumstance that the very symmetry at the core of his thinking 
is one of those illusions he himself was so adept at tearing to shreds when 
he found them in the thinking of others. As a consequence, the related 
concepts of language and metaphor become blurred or self-contradictory 
in his ﬁrst work, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music.
What is in my view the most interesting line which Nietzsche pursues 
in his relentless quest to expose epistemological errors is one that appears 
to anticipate Lacan’s “fonction de méconnaissance” – the element of 
misapprehension in the genesis of the human self. For Nietzsche too 
– long before Lacan – is highly sceptical as to whether there can ever be 
such a thing as a simple and accurate self-perception: “It must be stated 
deﬁnitively – we live only through illusions – our consciousness just grazes 
the surface [...]. There is also no question of a human individual’s wholly 
perceiving himself –  of all the laws that determine his existence becoming 
transparent to him in any given instant [...] (KSA 7, 434f.). In these terms, 
there are always distorting ﬂaws in one’s self-image, which Nietzsche in 
other contexts terms a discontinuity or a “displacement” (KSA 12, 114).
Thus we ﬁnd Nietzsche in his early essay, On Truth and Falsity in an 
Extra-Moral Sense, which remained unpublished in his lifetime, attributing 
this lacuna or displacement to the function of metaphor in everyday 
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language: “Thus language deceives us all. We believe we know something 
of things in themselves [...], but yet all we possess is metaphors of them 
which do not correspond in the least to the original entities” (KSA 1, 879). 
At this point he observes perspicaciously: “the origin of language has, in 
any event, nothing  to do with logic”, but then tacitly accepts the possibility 
that it might rather be a consensual, indeed democratic process. 
As a further consequence and because of the way the underlying 
symmetry I have mentioned above dominates his thinking, he blithely 
transposes a model he derives from the external sphere of social behaviour 
onto the very genesis of the individual psyche. 
This has two major effects. First, that discontinuity of which his 
understanding of metaphor is emblematic becomes primal in his view 
of the genesis of the human self. Second, the Other as such, because it 
seems essential to the genesis of language, becomes an implicit aspect of 
the self – and in distinctly negative terms: on the one hand because, in 
terms of the unquestioned symmetry, the relation of self to other mirrors 
that lack of correspondence to the “essence of things” that is the hallmark 
of language; on the other it leads to the positing of a gap between human 
consciousness and “primal being”, as will become clear from looking at 
The Birth of Tragedy.
Since, in Nietzsche’s analogical thought-patterns, the introjection of 
the Other into the self impairs its unity, the human psyche is reduced 
to “nothing that has any real effect, but a mere ﬁction” (KSA 12, 383). 
Nietzsche’s reaction to this devaluation of the self is often violent. As 
I shall show when looking at The Birth of Tragedy, it can manifest itself 
as a titanism in its efforts to obliterate the Other entirely and to restore 
a narcissistic perfection which anticipates Freud’s – and not Lacan’s 
– version of the myth. 
Whether ﬁction for Nietzsche is incarnated in the brilliant illusions of 
Homeric poetry or in the wretchedness of imprisonment in a world distorted 
by language as a “falsiﬁcation that perpetually heaps displacement upon 
displacement” (KSA 12, 114), it is always an emotionally charged realm 
of the unreal: positively as novel but illusory visions, negatively as a 
distortion of relationships within the self.
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What makes the concept of narcissism so complex when we apply 
it to Nietzsche’s writings is his deeply rooted tendency to equate an 
involuntary distortion in the perception of the self with the conscious 
inventions of art. For, on the one hand, the element of distortion makes the 
inner world potentially a region in which the conscious self is subjugated: 
“The greatest part of our being is unknown to us. Nevertheless we love 
ourselves, speak as it we wholly knew ourselves on the basis of a trivial 
amount of memory. We have a phantom of the ‚self’ in our heads, that 
dictates our thought and behaviour in manifold ways” (KSA 8, 561). On the 
other hand, we ﬁnd evidence of many attempts to reverse this relationship, 
to annihilate the “phantom” of the internalised Other, and this, as I shall 
show, is undertaken in the medium of ﬁction itself.
The tension between the self and the inner phantom of the Other 
becomes strongest in the semantics of the word lie. This tension is 
comparable to those Nietzsche injects into the concepts metaphor and 
ﬁction. For lies often appear in association with misery, as desperate 
measures taken against the inner dominance of the Other, whilst – in 
pure contradiction to this – the splendour of the “liberating lie”, as an 
autonomous “mythical feeling”, can appear in nostalgic transﬁguration: 
“We grant the epic narrator the freedom to lie, for in this instance there 
are no negative after effects [...] The great Greek philosophers still live 
entirely within this justiﬁcation to tell lies” (KSA 7, 452f.).
The thematics of narcissism in Nietzsche’s writing constantly revolve 
around the ambivalence of ﬁctions. The “mythical feeling of the liberating 
lie” (KSA 7, 452f.) opens a perspective on the “Homeric delight” in a world 
of ﬁctions in which there is not the slightest necessity to annihilate the 
Other or exorcise this “phantom” within the self: the pleasure Nietzsche 
grants that we may take in ﬁctionality goes hand in hand with a relatively 
relaxed attitude towards the Other. 
The monumental aggrandisement of the self with the purpose of 
effacing the Other reveals itself, by contrast, as a strategy dictated by 
insecurity. The self feels its integrity has already been compromised, that 
the unity of this “fabulous monster” (KSA 7, 832) can be nothing but a 
pretence. Such aporias in Nietzsche’s attitude towards ﬁctionality in his 
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later works are the lasting legacy of the narcissistic cosmology he devises 
in The Birth of Tragedy, a work we may regard as Nietzsche’s most vital 
and imaginative literary ﬁction, for all that he seemed convinced he was 
not writing ﬁction at the time. 
I should now like to try the experiment of reading The Birth of Tragedy 
as literature, as fantasy in the tradition to which Nietzsche assigned 
the Homeric epics and the “great Greek philosophers” – by whom he 
meant the Pre-Socratics – a tradition that enjoyed for him the privilege of 
“justiﬁed lying”. We shall also read this fantasy as a variant of the myth 
of Narcissus. In these terms, Nietzsche’s version anticipates those of both 
Freud and Lacan in the sense that the etiological element is central to it. In 
contrast to Lacan’s variant, but once more anticipating Freud’s, it shares 
Freud’s predilection for a lost paradisal state. However, the incidental 
fact that Nietzsche also shaped his fantasy in the prophetic mode because 
of his short-lived subservience to Wagner means that he must hold out 
the prospect of a paradise regained, whilst Freud’s situating “infant 
omnipotence” in linear time with no eschatological overtones means that 
such a state can only be viewed with nostalgia.
The dialectic of desire and autonomy that we saw as characteristic 
of Ovid’s presentation of the myth may also be detected in Nietzsche’s 
recasting of it. To grasp what Nietzsche is doing in The Birth of Tragedy, it 
is essential to realise that he is narrating from three different perspectives 
in turn, but without signalling any change of narrative standpoint. 
There is ﬁrstly the perspective in which Nietzsche writes as belonging 
to his own times. He does this reluctantly, because at heart he despises 
the “Culturmensch“, the “Man of Culture”, the member of the age of 
decadence into which European civilisation has fallen. None the less, he 
occasionally apostrophises his few “friends”, contemporaries who are 
equally aware they live in an age of cultural impoverishment, and writes 
as one of them. 
Secondly, he adopts the perspective of  “primal being” – “das Ur-Eine“ 
– which uses the human consciousness as a mirror in which it may view 
its own reﬂection, and this perspective is free from the constraints of 
historical time. It is essential to note that this perspective is twofold, since 
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within it Nietzsche’s viewpoint occasionally shifts to that of a generalised 
human consciousness that is both the narcissistic object of primal being 
and a subjectivity in which the process of self-mirroring is repeated and 
doubled. Thirdly, Nietzsche writes from an historical perspective that is 
not embedded in the decadent present, as is the ﬁrst, but rather enjoys a 
sovereign overview that comprehends the whole of humanity in time.
If we wish to unscramble the plot of The Birth of Tragedy, then we have 
to be aware that Nietzsche deploys two protagonists that are incompatible 
with one another and that compete for the status of hero. The former is 
named “the development of art”; the latter is termed variously “the one 
truly existing subject” (KSA 1, 47) or “ primal being” – “das Ur-Eine”, 
“das Ur-Sein” or “das Urwesen”. Sometimes this being is also identical 
with the consciousness of “Dionysian man” and, when this is the case, 
has the explicit goal of a frequent “satisfaction in total bliss” in moments 
of narcissistic union with itself.
The “development of art” has the disadvantage of being portrayed 
by Nietzsche as the product of a “duality” (KSA 7, 25), and thus 
represents for him a “third entity”. By contrast, union with “primal 
being” means precisely the abolition of that duality which consists of the 
opposition between the “truly existing subject” and its “projection” or 
“reﬂection”. By these last terms, Nietzsche also understands the human 
consciousness as object. The progressive movement of “the development 
of art” guarantees the lasting separation of the “Apollonian” from the 
“Dionysian” throughout human history once the golden age of tragedy 
is over, whereas the “destruction of the individual and its becoming one 
with primal being” (KSA 1, 62) has the opposite effect of “abolishing” or 
“devouring” not only all dualities but also the third entities that proceed 
from them (KSA 1, 141).
Nietzsche’s version of the Narcissus myth seems to portray the 
incompatible ways of being of both main protagonists as being of 
equivalent value. For that reason he must also insist on a perfect analogy 
between action in linear time and the timeless alternation of “primal joy” 
with its own absence. In this way, the discourse of The Birth of Tragedy 
performs the astonishing feat of at once afﬁrming both progress and 
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regression. Duality in art, or within the subject, oscillates in and out of 
existence, rather like the Cheshire Cat in Alice in Wonderland. In moments 
of “coalescence” or “annihilation” it disappears into the unity that has 
suddenly come about; when either of the two historical perspectives are 
dominant in the narrative, it is afﬁrmed as the origin of all things but 
perforce viewed nostalgically as a lost paradisal state.
In Nietzsche’s historical plot, more than two thousand uneventful years 
pass between the destruction of Dionysian drama – “optimistic dialectic 
expels [...] music from tragedy” (KSA 1, 95) and the ﬁrst indications of 
a “rebirth” of tragedy in the music of Richard Wagner (KSA 1, 103). As 
in Lacan’s version of the myth, this pseudo-historical or developmental 
perspective is obviously just an obstacle in the way of an optimal portrayal 
of events within the self – one which is simply made awkward by their 
compression into a strict linear series. Faced with this dilemma, Nietzsche 
ultimately opts for the solution of devaluing historicity, by forcing the ﬁrst 
protagonist, the “development of art” to put off its disguise and reveal 
itself as “regression”: “[...] it is just that we experience analogically the 
great periods of Hellenic being in reverse order, as it were, and thus now, 
for example, seem to be advancing from the Alexandrinian age backwards 
towards the period of genuine tragedy. In doing so the feeling lives 
within us that the birth of the tragic age means, for the German spirit, 
merely a return to itself, a blissful rediscovery of itself” (KSA 1, 128). By 
this he means, of course the new “tragic age” which Wagner’s music will 
usher in, but at this point he is no longer writing imaginative ﬁction but 
Wagnerian propaganda..
This is convoluted enough, but more is to come. For at the inception 
of that ﬁrst forward movement in time, which is a necessary precondition 
for any later regression, there is still an element of alienation present in the 
parallel dimension of the “truly existing subject”. That both Nietzsche and 
Lacan put so much emphasis on the primal status of self-alienation enjoins 
a further comparison of their respective versions of the Narcissus myth. 
For neither of them places much value on that utopian simplicity which 
appears in Freud’s version as the untrammelled enjoyment of the state 
of infant omnipotence. 
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For Lacan, misapprehension of the self characterises the “mirror stage”, 
while Nietzsche’s “truly existing subject” may indeed experience its 
moments of “satisfaction in total bliss”, but yet no primal state of perfect 
peace.12  Rather, Nietzsche’s preferred protagonist is subject to conﬂict 
from the outset, is both prey to suffering and division: “Thus I feel all 
the more strongly compelled to make the metaphysical assumption that 
the truly existing and primal being, as eternally suffering and riven by 
contradictions, [...] needs the pleasure of deceptive appearances so as to 
achieve its lasting redemption [...]” (KSA 1, 38f.). 
That one of the most aggressive atheists ever to set pen to paper should 
here feel prompted to have recourse to a very Christian-sounding concept 
of “redemption” is doubtless due to the fact that this is a recurrent theme 
in Wagner’s works from The Flying Dutchman and Tannhäuser to Parsifal. 
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche is still a long way from emerging from 
Wagner’s shadow. Making allowance for this, the fact remains that the 
ﬂaw that makes the “subject” for Nietzsche “eternally suffering and 
contradictory” and implants in it a desire for redemption that is present in 
the original state of “primal being” and motivates its ﬁrst action, namely 
the mirroring of itself.
The fatal ﬂaw, which makes the “original subject” one that is “eternally 
suffering and riven by contradictions”, thus producing a yearning for 
“redemption” or release, is thus already present in this initial act of 
self-reﬂection on the part of “das Ur-Eine”. It signiﬁes the opposite of 
narcissistic fulﬁlment and is termed frequently by Nietzsche in The Birth 
of Tragedy “Ur-Schmerz” –  primal agony (KSA 1, 38f.).  What Nietzsche 
there designates as “the world torn apart and shattered into individuals” 
is very clearly a projection of that ﬂaw subjectivity as such bears within 
itself from the outset and which appears elsewhere in his work as a fatal 
displacement or distortion in the process of self-perception. 
Looked at from another perspective, this “primal agony” is equally 
clearly grounded in the failure of the “original subject” to withhold itself 
from the process of historical development, for it is this which produces 
that fundamental self-estrangement that occurs when the Other is 
introjected into the self. The unfolding of the subjectivity in linear time 
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is consonant with that desire for “redemption” which can in principle 
never be satisﬁed – otherwise any merging of the self with its own image 
or, as Nietzsche terms it in The Birth of Tragedy, any “annihilation of mere 
appearances” would at once terminate the process.13 
It is necessary to stress again at this point that the semantics of lying 
represent a crossroads in Nietzsche’s thinking. The one way leads in 
the direction of “the mythical feeling of the liberating lie”; the other 
takes him to where lying brings down punishment, designates a ﬂaw 
or lack in the given context or connotes involuntary renunciation, hence 
impoverishment. In the syntagmatic dimension of The Birth of Tragedy, that 
is: in the ﬁctional narrative that unfolds in the text, Nietzsche experiments 
with the former direction, whereas in the paradigmatic dimension of the 
text, that is: its ultimate conceptual assignment of values, he has from the 
outset decided for the latter. For there is in that dimension a correlation 
of the ‚imprisoning lie’ with the superior might of both the Other and 
of history that remains quite ﬁxed. This is another way of explaining 
the phenomenon frequently commented upon by readers of The Birth of 
Tragedy that the text is somehow written against itself.14 
The reading of The Birth of Tragedy I have offered here has tried to show 
what underlies the superﬁcial plot, which is a fanciful account of the rise 
and fall of Ancient Greek culture, as deﬁned by its crowning achievements, 
the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles, and its destruction, ﬁrst seen 
in the works of Euripides and then fully accomplished by the rationality 
of Socrates. The flowering of Greek culture is made possible by a 
complementary interaction of the principles embodied by the gods Apollo 
and Dionysos. Apollo represents the world of pleasing appearances, the 
principle of individuation, art-forms such as sculpture and in general the 
clear structural principles that shape and restrain the anarchical tendencies 
of the Dionysian (KSA1, 39f). 
This equivalence is not really valid, because the Dionysian is much 
more vital and sustains the whole: “Apollo could not live without 
Dionysus!” (KSA 1, 40). It is in his fantasies about the role of the “chorus 
of satyrs” in the best of Greek tragedy that Nietzsche develops those 
patterns of thought from which I have derived his theory of narcissism. 
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For the chorus in the early phase of tragedy is deﬁned by Nietzsche as 
“the self-mirroring of Dionysian humanity” (KSA 1, 60). Moreover, he 
postulates an identiﬁcation of the spectators with the chorus as “the 
primal dramatic phenomenon: to see oneself transformed before one’s 
own eyes and now to act as if one had really entered into another body 
and into another character. [...] here there already occurs a surrender of 
individuality by venturing into an alien nature” (KSA 1, 61). 
This forms the basis for the admixture of the Other in the original 
narcissistic unity. But Nietzsche then goes on to daringly posit a direct 
line from the experience of tragedy to the internal dramas being acted out 
within the underworld of “primal being”. Thus the audience of Greek 
tragedy comes to experience “the breaking apart of the individuality 
and its becoming one with primal being [dem Ursein]” (KSA 1, 62). 
Because Nietzsche’s analogical thinking constantly translates one level 
of experience or mode of existence into another, Dionysos, not as a god, 
but as a ﬁgure on stage, becomes identiﬁed both with primal being and 
with its suffering from its own imperfection: “Greek tragedy in its oldest 
form had no other subject than the sufferings of Dionysos and Dionysos 
was for a long time the sole hero of a tragic action” (KSA 1, 71). 
Thus ‘we’ – as imaginary spectators of such a tragedy – also become 
assimilated into “primal being”: “For ﬂeeting moments, we are truly 
primal being [das Urwesen] itself and feel its voracious desire for existence 
and pleasure in existence; the conﬂict, the agony, the annihilation of mere 
appearances now seems necessary to us [...] no longer as individuals, 
but as the one living entity with whose joy in procreation we have now 
merged” (KSA 1, 109). Nietzsche’s ideal audience surely got a lot for the 
price of admission.
All of this is too good to last, and so Ancient Greek tragedy dies: “it died 
by self-murder, as the result of an unresolvable conﬂict, thus tragically”, 
whilst other ancient literary forms just fade gracefully away. It is at this 
point that Nietzsche’s surface plot loses credibility and coherence. For 
he arbitrarily dumps the whole blame for the death of tragedy, ﬁrst on 
Euripides and then on Socrates: “Even Euripides himself was in this 
sense only a mask: the god who spoke through him was not Dionysos, 
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nor Apollo either, but an entirely newborn demon named Socrates” (KSA 
1, 83). Socrates becomes the “single turning point [...] in so called world 
history” and plunges humanity into a state of decadence which lasts 
until the thought of Schopenhauer inspires Wagner, and Wagner sets 
about recreating “Dionysian music” and thus the basis for a “rebirth of 
tragedy” (KSA 1, 103).
Clearly the death of tragedy lacks at this point of the text an adequate 
explanation – even in terms of Nietzsche’s quicksilver concepts. In 
denigrating Euripides, Nietzsche simply follows a prejudice that arose in 
the writings of the Early German Romantics, August Wilhelm and Friedrich 
Schlegel, in the closing years of the 18th century and was then accepted and 
propagated as dogma by Schelling, Hegel and other 19th century German 
theorists of tragedy. Earlier, the German classicists, Goethe and Schiller, had 
expressed the greatest admiration for Euripides. Schiller saw in Euripides’ 
Medea the archetype of tragic passion, and Goethe, who lived till 1832, 
regarded the fashionable contempt for Euripides on the part of theorists 
who could produce no tragedies themselves, as sheer foolishness. 
Half a century later, Nietzsche seems quite unaware that in the Bacchae 
Euripides had produced a tragedy that gloriﬁes Dionysos and revolves 
around the punishment of Pentheus, who has shown disrespect to the 
god: he is torn apart by a crowd of women, including his own mother and 
aunt, in a Dionysian frenzy. Furthermore, Socrates, in Nietzsche’s version, 
embodies so many of the principles that he has previously attributed to 
Apollo, that it makes no sense that Greek culture had ﬂourished under 
the aegis of Apollo before Dionysos appeared on the scene, but yet, once 
Socratic clear-thinking appeared, slid into a decadence which – in the 
form of European civilisation – persists for two millennia before Wagner 
arrived to regenerate things. 
Furthermore, whilst Apollo was the Ancient Greek god of music, 
Nietzsche is obliged to invent a “Dionysian music” – for which there is 
no historical evidence at all – to effect the immersion of the audience for 
genuine Greek tragedy in “primal being”. But “Dionysian music” is also 
a necessary ﬁction in another sense: it has to have existed so Wagner can 
revive it.
Anthony Stephens: Reﬂecting Tragedy: Nietzsche, Lacan, Narcissus
L&A 2007.1.indd   90 21/2/08   7:54:45 AM
Literature  & Aesthetics 17(1) July 2007, page 91 
This mass of implausibilities clearly points to the fact that the real 
plot is unfolding on another level of the text. There the ﬂaw in the self-
mirroring of primal being can produce the tragic suffering that envelops 
both stage and audience and makes them one with the Dionysian basis 
of all existence for only so long before the inexorable progress of linear 
time – “so called world history” – dissolves the precarious synthesis that 
has made great tragedy possible. Nietzsche has set a trap for himself by 
positing he development of Greek literature as an evolutionary process: 
the “naïve” age of the Homeric epics and of early lyric poetry is purely 
Apollolonian. Dionysos, the new god from Asia, then arrives and, in a 
further evolutionary stage, achieves a synthesis with Apollo – and the 
miracle of great tragedy is the result. In this phase of the story, Nietzsche 
then largely abandons the level of narrative progression to explore the 
timeless realm of “primal being” and discover both its essential narcissism 
and the ﬂaw within it that gives rise to the “primal agony”, which is then 
portrayed on stage as the sufferings of Dionysos. Because in this realm 
each level of existence is a perfect analogy of all others and because they 
may all merge with each other, the extraordinary myth he creates also 
serves as an account of the genesis of the human self. 
But there is a fatal dichotomy between this dimension of the tale, 
which is immune to history –  ﬁrstly because “primal being” is timeless; 
secondly because the same process is repeated in the psyche of  every 
new human individual – and the other, prior phase of the plot, which 
has as its protagonist “the development of art”. Since in the dimension 
of Nietzsche’s ﬁction in which the greatest Greek tragedy is seen as just 
such a development, there is no escaping a further historical phase in 
which it gives way to something else, namely Socratic decadence. Because 
Nietzsche’s discourse has moved so freely between the two dimensions 
which, in their understanding of time, are quite incompatible with one 
another, he becomes sorely embarrassed when he has to account for the 
death of tragedy. 
The blustering tirades against Euripides and Socrates are the result. 
This was only one aspect of The Birth of Tragedy which scandalised 
Nietzsche’s fellow philologists. Not only his teacher Ritschl thought 
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the scholarly aspect of the book nonsense, but a younger colleague, von 
Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, wrote a pamphlet demolishing in detail its 
claims to accuracy.15  But even later generations of readers, who care nothing 
for the book’s philological deﬁciencies, have been troubled by the apparent 
incoherence of the ﬁctional narrative. As I have tried to show, this is due 
to the fact that Nietzsche is writing one ﬁction against another.
The latter sections of the book continue even today to attract the 
most criticism. This is because Nietzsche has, in the earlier parts, created 
a succession of extreme ﬁctional tensions which demand a resolution. 
But since Nietzsche claims not to be writing ﬁction, indeed expresses 
contempt for ﬁction, there can be no adequate ﬁctional ending, since this 
would involve further metaphorical transpositions and metaphors are 
intrinsically ﬁctional. 
Thus Nietzsche must have recourse to breaking out of the imaginary 
world he has created and taking the fatal step into the contemporary 
German present. Sadly, Nietzsche then indulges in those gloriﬁcations of 
Wagner that were soon to be so painful for him to acknowledge. He even 
goes so far as to represent the Franco-Prussian war as the newly reawoken 
German Spirit purifying itself of alien elements: “Perhaps many of us 
are of the view that this Spirit must begin its struggle with the expulsion 
of what is of Romance origin: we may perceive an external preparation 
for this and an encouragement of it in the victorious bravery and bloody 
splendour of the recent war [...] And if Germans are hesitantly looking 
about for a leader who will take them back into their long-lost homeland 
[...]they need do no more than listen to the blissfully tempting call of the 
Dionysian bird that hovers over them and wants to show them the way 
to it.” (KSA 1, 149)
The way led, of course, to Bayreuth, and the leader was Wagner. 
Interestingly, Nietzsche here revives the belief invented by the Early 
Romantics at the beginning of the 19th century that there was a special 
afﬁnity between the Ancient Greeks and the German Spirit, so that, by 
streaming to Bayreuth, Germans were – in Nietzsche’s imagination – 
revisiting the world of Aeschylus and Sophocles. It was a sad irony that by 
the time Wagner’s masterwork was complete and ready for performance, 
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Nietzsche had become sufﬁciently disillusioned with the Master that he 
himself ﬂed Bayreuth to escape the premiere of the Ring-cycle.16 
If one takes a detached view of the literary form of The Birth of Tragedy, 
then it reveals itself to be essentially a series of dialogues and shows clear 
afﬁnities to the agon or dispute in the Attic comedy – a genre on which 
Nietzsche heaps contempt in his own text as he classes it as a “degenerate 
form of tragedy” (KSA 1, 76).17  The three narrative perspectives create three 
different voices, one of which – that of Nietzsche as “Man of Culture” 
– fulﬁls the function of the chorus as commentator and, occasionally, 
referee. Of the two antagonists, the former “the one truly existing subject” 
still years for the ideal of narcissistic perfection in the mythical realm, 
whereas the latter, “the development of art” cannot but acknowledge 
linear time and insist on the fate that awaits all myths, namely “to creep 
into the conﬁnes of an allegedly historical reality and to be treated by 
some later age or other as a unique historical episode [...] For this is the 
way in which religions are prone to die out” (KSA 1, 74).
The “subject” desires narcissistic fulﬁlment in the rhythmic alternation 
of “fusions” and “annihilations”; its antagonist keeps reminding it that 
precisely this dualism is the ﬂaw that has forced it out of its mythic 
paradise and given rise to the processuality of time, so that desire must 
henceforth seek its fulﬁlment in this dimension and that, as a result, 
all “blissful satisfaction” has been postponed indeﬁnitely. At this point 
Nietzsche, as the “Man of Culture”, intervenes, puts a stop to the ﬁctional 
agon and delegates the outcome to Richard Wagner and the “German 
Myth” (KSA 1, 147). Historicity gives up the contest, converts to a belief in 
regression, and, when the curtain comes down, more “blissful satisfaction” 
is promised in the “temple of both divinities”, which has now conveniently 
been erected in Bayreuth – but who is convinced? Certainly not Nietzsche 
himself for very long.
After one has discarded all the spurious philology and all the 
embarrassing subservience to Wagner that was to plague Nietzsche 
himself till his ﬁnal descent into madness, what remains of prime interest 
in The Birth of Tragedy? Surely is the underlying theory of narcissism that 
anticipates so much of what Lacan was – almost a century later and with 
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no conscious reference to Nietzsche – to integrate into his retelling of 
the myth of Narcissus in terms of the primacy of the distortion of self-
perception, the “fonction de méconnaissance”, and the subjugation of the 
self to the Symbolic Order.
If one looks for an explanation for these similarities, then we may ﬁnd 
it in the fact that both thinkers were deeply inﬂuenced by both Hegel and 
Rousseau. Lacan’s dependence on Hegelian thought, as transmitted via the 
writings of Kojève, is well documented as are the Rousseauistic elements 
in his thinking. Nietzsche rejected Hegel and abhorred Rousseau, but the 
inﬂuence of both on his thought seems much greater than he was ever 
willing to admit.
Finally, what remains the most lasting and imaginative achievement of 
Nietzsche’s ﬁrst published work is to have opened a perspective, through 
all its veils of analogy, onto the genesis of the modern self as an ineluctably 
tragic event. He can do so only by relating ﬁctions which purport to be 
about something else. But is it from the collapse of these fantasies about 
“Dionysian music” or the advent of Socrates as the turning-point of human 
history that a coherent narrative of the tragic division within modern 
individuality emerges.
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